•The Effect of Industry Restructuring on Peer Firms , with Paul Mason. Journal of Risk and Financial Management. 2021 (February); 14(5):205. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm14050205
• Investment Income Taxes and Private Equity Acquisition Activity, with Paul Mason and Harold Zhang. Journal of Empirical Finance, 59, 2020 (August), pp 25-51
• Hospital Capital Budgeting During a Public Health Crisis, with Dean G. Smith. Journal of Health Care Finance, 46-4, 2020 (April), pp 23-36
• Expectations of Reciprocity and Feedback when Competitors Share Information: Experimental Evidence, with Bernhard Ganglmair and Noah Myung. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 170, 2020 (February), pp 244-267
• The Effect of Informative Events in a Contingent Claims Pricing Framework: Evidence from Newly Issued Securities Markets, with Paul Mason.
In this paper we use initial public offerings as a quasi-natural experiment with which to study the effect of information signals, on peer firms, within a contingent claims pricing framework. We conclude that peer investors systematically view the IPO as a signal that portends a rise in expected industry growth. We show that peer investors expect the information signaled by the IPO to mainly affect the volatility of their firm. In a contingent claims framework this results in an asymmetric price change, with equity investors experiencing a negative return and debt investors experiencing a positive return.
• Damage Control: Changes in Disclosure Tone after Financial Misconduct, with Rebecca Files, Paul Mason, and Gerry Martin.
This paper examines whether managers attempt to mitigate the negative outcomes of financial misconduct by altering the tone of required disclosures. Using a series of difference-in-differences analyses, we show that following fraudulent activity, managers use more negative and litigious words in disclosures, as compared to a matched sample of control firms. We find managers that have a larger set of negative outcomes, such as those with foreknowledge of the fraud committed, are more aggressive in altering disclosure when compared to peer firms. Our results also suggest that negative outcomes due to financial misconduct, such as monetary fines and reputation loss, are mitigated by altering the tone in financial disclosures. Altogether, we conclude that managers alter disclosures to reduce the set of negative outcomes they face following securities law violations.
- Market Threats and Firms’ Choice of 401K Options, with Han Xia.
- Through a Glass Darkly: Going Private Transactions as a Reflection of IPO’s, with Dupinder Kaur, and Paul Mason.
- Framing: It Really Does Matter, with Catherine Eckel.